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I.

INTRODUCTION

Senator Philip Hart is regarded by friend and adversary alike
as one of God's gentle creatures. Why he would seek to dismember
the American petroleum industry is quite difficult to perceive. His
divestiture proposal, S. 2387, would break the large, vertically integrated oil companies into diverse functional pieces. At least in part,
his proposal is seemingly based on an aversion to big business per
se. This hostility to large scale American enterprise fails to account
for certain preliminary studies which indicate that large companies
have contributed significantly to increases in technological progress,
to faster gains in productivity, to flatter (or even downsloping) price
trends, and to rising living standards. This particular opposition to
large integrated oil companies seems to arise from a misunderstanding of the role of integration in petroleum operations and a
refusal to believe that the large oil companies do compete with one
another.
* General Counsel, American Petroleum Institute. B.A., University of Michigan, 1938;
J.D., University of Michigan, 1941.
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This article endeavors to explain the rationale of vertical integration, to discuss some of the arguments surrounding divestiture,
and to describe the consequences of divestiture if S. 2387 becomes
law. The following discussion shows that careful examination of the
structure and performance of the petroleum industry fails to yield
any conclusive evidence of inordinate monopoly power. On the contrary, the economic indicia strongly suggest that at the very least
the industry is "workably competitive" at all stages.' Further, the
contention that divestiture would strengthen this nation's interests
vis-a-vis the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Companies nations has been dispelled. Thus the grounds used publicly to justify
divestiture efforts appear to be specious. Unless there is some unperceived rationale for passing such legislation, its enactment would
seem to be without reason and without any avowed or discernible
benefit to society.
While there are great uncertainties whether divestiture would
yield any benefits to society, it is clear that it would entail substantial costs. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to venture
a precise quantitative estimate of the total cost that society would
bear as a result of divestiture, the article will delineate the probable
consequences for domestic petroleum consumers, affected firms,
claimants on the assets of those firms, domestic energy supplies,
and the United States economy in general.
II.

A.

THE RATIONALE OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION

The Concept of Vertical Integrationin General

Before discussing the arguments concerning divestiture or its
economic ramifications, it is appropriate to consider the theory of
vertical integration as it applies to firms in general and to petroleum
firms specifically in order to understand why firms choose to structure themselves in this manner and why economic benefits will be
negated as a result of breaking up the oil industry.
The reason offered most frequently by economists to explain
why firms vertically integrate' is that it is economical to internalize
1. There also does not appear to be much support in the economics literature for the
notion that the industry could be made more vigorously competitive in the absence of vertical
integration. See Peltzman, Issues in Vertical Integration Policy, in PUBc POLICY ToWARDS
MEiRERS 167-76 (Weston & Peltzman ed. 1969).
2. The term "vertical integration" refers to the extent that a firm controls assets spanning the entire range of successive production and distribution stages of any particular good.
In the petroleum industry, it refers to the simultaneous operation in more than one of the
industry's four phases: production, refining, transportation, and marketing.
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certain exchange transactions rather than buy or sell in the marketplace.3 Although a firm could choose to purchase its needed inputs
rather than produce them and sell its output rather than process it
further (or transport it farther), the opportunity to do so is not
without cost.' Since the course of future events is uncertain, a firm
disposed to making "arms-length" transactions with other firms is
confronted with potential vagaries of price, quantity, and quality.5
In order to schedule and coordinate production efficiently, the firm
must gather information on market conditions in order to develop
a reasonable set of expectations about the future.' Needed information, however, may be acquired only at a cost or sacrifice of real
resources. 7 Even discovering the relevant price signals in the market
requires an expenditure of resources."
There may be additional costs associated with the search for
appropriate trading partners, including costs of negotiating contracts, establishing favorable terms of trade,9 costs of enforcing contract compliance, and costs of adjusting to stochastic variations in
transaction prices, quantities, or qualities. When uncertainty is
high and transaction costs are excessive, it is both reasonable and
socially desirable from the standpoint of efficient resource allocation
for firms to organize in a manner that reduces these costs just as
they seek to minimize other costs of production. Quite simply, vertical integration reduces transaction costs because it reduces the
number of interfirm transactions. It allows "economies of management"'" to be achieved by promoting specialization in decisionmak3. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937).
4. Id.; see Malmgren, Information, Expectations and the Theory of the Firm, 75 Q.J.
EcoN. 399 (1961).
5. This reflects a tendency of individual firms to behave in an opportunistic, selfserving manner. While a firm's trading partner may be quite willing to transact business at
certain specified terms today, it may be quite unwilling to accept the same terms under
changed circumstances if its interests are compromised.
6. Coase, supra note 3; Malmgren, supra note 4. See also Teece, Vertical Integration

in the U.S. Oil Industry, in

VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN THE OIL INDUSTRY

108-09 (E. Mitchell

ed. 1976).
7. J.B. McCollum, Information, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 1968 (unpublished doctoral dissertation at Tulane University) (copy available through the American
Petroleum Institute).
8. Id.
9. Executing long-term contracts is an option available to firms seeking to reduce future
market uncertainties. However, these contracts are inherently inflexible. Limits on the ability
of firms to collect and retrieve information may mean that no contract can be written to cover
all contingencies that might develop in time. Short-term contracts offer more flexibility, but
additional costs are incurred because of the greater frequency with which contracts must be
negotiated. See Teece, supra note 6, at 109.
10. Hearingson S. 1167 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
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ing, more efficient information flow, greater adaptability to unforeseen circumstances, and a commonality of interests." This permits
a firm to conserve on resources that otherwise must be spent in
conducting open market transactions.
B.

Vertical Integrationin the Petroleum Industry

The enhanced coordination and planning brought about by
vertical integration is especially important in the petroleum industry:
Each stage of the industry-production, refining, transportation, and marketing-is highly dependent upon others. The success of a refinery is more a
function of success in the raw materials and product markets than of success
in refinery operations. It is apparently more efficient in many circumstances
to plan jointly corollary and supporting investments than to rely on other firms
at other stages to make the right investments at the right time in the right
place. This is not to say that other firms couldn't make these investments. It
is that they will make them less efficiently.'"

The efficiencies referred to arise in part because of investment
considerations that characterize the industry. Substantial capital
sums are required to take advantage of scale economies in refining
and pipeline transportation. Once these facilities are built, the capital is frozen in assets that are immobile, highly specialized in purpose, and have little or no salvage value. Investors in the pipeline
transportation and refinery sectors of the industry inherently run
the risk of earning low rates of return should the flow of crude oil or
other products through their assets be reduced or interrupted. As a
means of reducing risk, it is not surprising that they integrate to
seek "assurances" of adequate supplies of crude oil or other products and dependable markets.' 3 Scholars have long rationalized
vertical integration of the oil industry in terms of assurances:
The essence of integration . . . is the protection it offers or seems to offer
against the uncertainties and instabilities of reliance on often highly imperfect
intermediate markets. It is a means by which oil companies have attempted,
in an industry that is potentially highly unstable, to stake out and insulate
market positions by securing dependable sources of supply (of raw materials
and products) and dependable market outlets (for crude oil and products)."
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 8, at 6065 (1974) (testimony of Edward
Mitchell) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1167].
11. Teece, supra note 6, at 110.
12. Hearings on S. 1167, supra note 10, at 6065.
13. M. G. DE CHAZEAU & A. E. KAHN, INTEGRATION AND COMPETITION IN THE PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY 115 (Petroleum Monograph Series vol. 3, 1959).
14. Mitchell, CapitalCost Savings of Vertical Integration, in VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN
THE OIL INDUSTRY 80 (E. Mitchell ed. 1976). Explaining petroleum industry vertical integra-
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Similarly:
Vertical integration represents a means of reducing the risks associated with
refinery investments because it serves to protect a refinery on. . . the points
where it has great competitive vulnerability. Integration forward into marketing activities constitutes one of the best means by which a refiner may guard
against a forced reduction of throughput in times when the refined products
markets are oversupplied, and backward integration into crude oil production
constitutes one of the best means by which a refiner may be assured of adequate oil supplies at reasonable prices in times of crude shortages. Similarly,
integration into transportation operations constitutes one of the best means by
which a refiner may be assured of having the transportation facilities necessary
to his situation. For example, once a refinery location has developed economic
characteristics which permit or require the use of pipe lines to move crude oil
inward, or refined products outward, a refiner often cannot afford to wait for
the pipe line investments to be made by outside interests but must build the
lines himself to keep his operations on a competitive basis. 5

The concern over the availability of crude oil supplies in the
refining sector arises in part because of certain processing constraints. In some cases, a refinery is designed initially for a limited
range of crude oil characteristics and is able to process crudes with
differing characteristics only after making costly plant adjustments.
Vertical integration helps to ensure adequate supplies of the preferred quality of crude at relatively constant costs over time."5
Most modern refineries, however, are geared to handle a variety
of crude types that are sold in active markets. What probably contributes to the concern for availability is the history of crude oil
price control in this country. 17 In the past, crude oil shortages have
tion in terms of "assurances" may appear to differ at first glance from the transaction cost
rationale advanced earlier for firms in general. Both explanations, however, are one and the
same. Mitchell writes:
As mentioned earlier, businessmen do not usually couch their arguments for vertical
integration in terms of contractual or communication problems. Typically, they will
think in terms of the importance of reliable supplies, assured markets, the reduction of
risk, and lower financing costs. Yet, while what he says is seemingly different, the
businessman is in fact saying the same thing as the economist. When the businessman
says he must acquire an upstream supplier to assure reliable supplies he is saying that
it is impossible to write an ironclad and complete contract with an upstream supplier
that gives him the assurances he needs to run his plant efficiently, or that no upstream
company knows exactly what he requires and none is likely to know it in the near future.
In brief, because of the impracticability of perfect contracting or the lack of communication of his needs, it is cheaper and more timely for the businessman to do it himself.
Id.
15. J. McLEAN & R. HAIGH, THE GROWTH OF INTEGRATED OIL COMPANIES 665 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as MCLEAN & HAIGHI.
16. These costs are relative to what it would cost refiners to purchase the desired crude
elsewhere in conditions, for example, of market scarcity.
17. Hearingson S. 1167, supra note 10, pt. 8, at 6065-66 (1974). Crude oil prices were
controlled formally during World War II, during the Korean War, and beginning in 1971
under President Nixon's New Economic Program. Today "old" oil, along with natural gas
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developed as the value of crude exceeded the price permitted by
government. 8 In other words, prices were set at such a level that the
quantity of crude demanded by consumers exceeded the quantity
producers were willing to supply. Faced with the specter of formal
or informal price control in the past few decades, firms prepared for
what they considered to be inevitable oil shortages. Even companies
outside the petroleum sector, including chemical, automobile, and
steel companies, recognized the reality of price control induced
shortages and initiated integration backwards into the production
of crude oil and natural gas in order to assure essential supplies.'9
Alternative methods of obtaining assurances against unfavorable market contingencies clearly exist. Depending on how much a
firm is willing to pay, it could enlist the services of additional crude
oil brokers, bargaining agents, lawyers, and other personnel to reduce the probability of costly interruptions. It also could hold, although probably only at great cost, large crude inventories and
product storage capacity. The point is not that vertical integration
is the only means of achieving security or dependability of supply
for large-scale capital investments; rather, because it is generally
less expensive for a firm to control at least some crude oil sources
or market outlets, it is more economically secure to integrate vertically.
Another economy traceable to oil industry vertical integration
springs from the relationship of profitability between the various
sectors of the industry. Studies indicate that profits in production,
refining, transportation, and marketing do not correlate directly
with one another. These studies further show that integration between sectors brings a degree of earnings stability to the oil firm so
structured." For example, a survey conducted over the period from
1920 to 1952 found that a nonintegrated mid-continent refiner
sold in interstate commerce, remains subject to formal price control. Furthermore, on an
informal basis, government fiat also has had a control effect on crude prices. In 1959, President Eisenhower's Proclamation Adjusting Imports of Petroleum and Petroleum Products
into the United States empowered the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
to maintain constant surveillance of crude oil price increases to determine whether such
increases met with national security objectives. Pres. Proc. No. 3279, §6(a), 3 C.F.R. 11
(1964), 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1970).
18. Mitchell bases this conclusion on the spurts in crude prices that took place during
periods when controls were relaxed. Hearings on S. 1167, supra note 10, at 6065.
19. Dupont, for example, has announced its intention to invest in a 100,000 barrels per
day refinery with Amoco for the purpose of reducing its reliance on others for energy supplies.
See Brumm, Talk Set on 100,000 BID GrassrootsUnit, Oil Daily, Oct. 24, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
See also Hearingson S. 1167, supra note 10, at 6066; Dupont Signs Letter to Acquire Shenandoah Oil, Wall Street J., Feb. 9, 1976, at 2, col. 2.
20. McLEAN & HAIGH, supra note 15, at 501-06.
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experienced average monthly fluctuations in gross margins four
times greater than an integrated refiner. 21 Thus integrated oil firms,
holding what amount to diversified asset portfolios, provide a service to investors that their nonintegrated counterparts do not,
namely, reducing the risks attending investment. 2 As a result, the
cost of capital2 3 to an integrated firm is relatively lower, which
means that it can attract and borrow funds more cheaply and
thereby increase investment in all sectors of the industry more than
would take place otherwise.
III.

THE ARGUMENTS FOR DIVESTITURE ARE UNSOUND

The proponents of divestiture express the view that the petroleum industry is dominated by a small, oligopolistic group of noncompetitive companies. A careful consideration of the arguments
advanced by the proponents of divestiture shows that they do not
sustain the heavy burden of proof which should be a condition precedent to such a punitive, drastic legislative proposal.
A.

Competition in the Oil Industry
(1)

Concentration Ratios

Divestiture proponents argue that there is an alarming degree
of concentration in the energy industry.2 4 They contend that this is
evidenced by the major companies' control of crude exploration and
production.2 5 Intertwined with their argument is the belief that concentration in the oil industry is facilitated by the sharing of risks
and profits through joint ventures in the ownership of crude oil
21. Id. at 118, 122-23, 133.
22. Raymond B. Gary of Morgan, Stanley & Co., Inc. testified before the Subcommittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly that:
Our experience in selling petroleum company securities over the years has been that
investors place a high value upon the fact that the larger companies are vertically
integrated and are hence generally more stable and economically more efficient, exhibiting a consequent lesser risk from an investment point of view. In our view, the generally
high investment quality of these larger petroleum companies is in many respects attributable to the benefits of their vertically integrated structure.
Hearings on S. 2387 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1970 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on S. 23871.
23. The cost of capital for an industry can be defined as the minimum expected rate of
return necessary to induce capital to flow to the industry.
24. Hearings on S. 2387, supra note 22, pt. 3, at 2162 (1976) (statement of Senator
Tunney).
25. 121 CONG. REc. 1146 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1975) (remarks of Senator Abourezk).
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producing leases and production, pipelines, certain refining operations, and international ventures."6
Monopoly power is indicated generally by control of a market
by one or a few sellers. Such monopoly power customarily is measured in terms of concentration ratios that are defined as the percentage of assets, value added, or output accounted for by a specified
number of the largest companies in an industry." Government studies of monopoly power commonly utilize concentration ratios based
on value added by the largest four or eight companies in an industry.28 It is generally thought that the higher the concentration ratio,
the greater the monopoly power in an industry;29 the theory is that
the larger the share of the market controlled by a few firms, the
more probable it is that they will be able to collude and strike
agreements of mutual benefit.
Table 1 depicts the percentages accounted for by the four largest and eight largest companies in various energy industries in the
areas of petroleum reserves, capacity, production, refining, and
marketing. Tables 2 and 3 show the concentration ratios in 1967 and
1972 for the major industrial sectors and other selected industrial
sectors of the United States. In 1972, the concentration ratio for the
four largest companies' crude production was 29.4 percent, for refining 31.0 percent, and for gasoline sales 29.0 percent. In the same
year, the concentration ratio for the eight largest companies for
crude production was 46.9 percent, for refining 56.0 percent, and for
gasoline sales 51.6 percent. In 1972, the concentration ratios for
major industrial sectors of the U.S. ranged from 31 to 93 percent for
the four largest companies in a particular industry and from 44 to
100 percent for the eight largest companies in an industry. It is
evident from these figures that the divestiture proponents' argument that the oil industry must be dismembered because of excessive concentration doesn't hold water. The facts demonstrate that
the petroleum industry is much less concentrated than most nonenergy industries. In his testimony before the Committee on the
Judiciary, Thomas Kauper, then Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, testified that "[tihe petroleum industry appears to
be one of the least concentrated of our nation's major industries."3
26. Id.
27. Hearings on S. 2387, supra note 22, pt. 3, at 2096 (1976) (testimony of William
Johnson).
28. W. JOHNSON, R. MESSICK, S. VAN VACTOR & F. WYANT, COMPETITION IN THE OIL
INDUSTRY 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as JOHNSON].
29. Id. at 2.

30.

SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, MINORITY VIEWS AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS ON

S. 2387,
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TABLE 1::1
CONCENTRATION RATIOS FOR
MAJOR SECTORS OF THE ENERGY INDUSTRY
OF THE UNITED STATES

Sector
Crude Oil Reserves
1970
Crude Oil Production
1955
1970
1972
Total Crude Oil and Natural
Gas Liquids Production
1972
Petroleum Refining
1955
1972
Gasoline Sales
1954
1972
Natural Gas Sales (interstate)
1955
1971
Lubricating Oils and Greases
1957
1972
Uranium Mining and
Milling Capacity
1971
Coal Production
1955
1972

Percentage
Accounted for by
the Largest 4
Companies

Percentage
Accounted for by
the Largest 8
Companies

37.2

63.9

18.8
30.5
29.4*

31.1
50.1
46.9'

28.8:

45.8*

32.8**'
31.0**

57.5**
56.0**

31.2
29.0

54.0
51.6

23.0
25.3

35.0
42.8

38.02*
31.0"*

50.0**
44.0**

54.4**:

78.5***

16.5
30.4

24.0
40.4

::MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL, Petroleum Evgineer, and U.S. Bureau of Mines.
;::,BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1957 AND 1972
FACTURERS: CONCENTRATION RATIOS IN MANUFACTURING.

CENSUS OF MANU-

*:*: ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 20 (1971).

S. REP. No. 1005, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 208 (1976) (remarks of Thomas Kauper)
[hereinafter cited as SENATE MINORITY REPORT].
31. JOHNSON, supra note 28, at 3. (Data collected from T. DUCNESNEAU, COMPETITION IN
THE ENERGY INDUSTRY

(1975).
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TABLE 232
CONCENTRATION RATIOS FOR MAJOR
INDUSTRIAL SECTORS OF THE UNITED STATES

Percentage of
Value of Shipments
Accounted for by
the Largest 4
Companies

Sector

Primary Aluminum
Flat Glass
Motor Vehicles
Primary Copper
Tires and Inner Tubes
Aircraft
Industrial Gases
Alkalines and Chlorine
Synthetic Rubber
Blast Furnaces and Steel Mills
Industrial Trucks and Tractors
Semiconductors
Weaving Mills (synthetic)
Ship Building and Repairing
Construction Machinery
Lubricating Oils and Greases
Fertilizers
Petroleum Refining
Weaving Mills (cotton)

Percentage of
Value of Shipments
Accounted for by
the Largest 8
Companies

1967

1972

1967

1972

d
94
92
77
70
69
67
63
61
48
48
47
46
42
41
38
35
33
30

79
92
93
72
73
66
65
72
62
44
50
57
39
47
43
31
35
31
31

100
98
98
98
88
89
84
88
82
66
62
65
54
59
53
50
55
57

92
d
99
100
90
86
81
91
81
65
66
70
54
63
54
44
53
56

48

48

d. The government withholds these data to avoid disclosing information about
individual companies.

Professor J.S. Bain, a respected specialist in industrial organization, has suggested the standards found in Table 4 for determining the level of concentration in manufacturing industries. These
standards indicate that the concentration in the oil industry should
be classified as low in the four-firm category and moderately low in
the eight-firm category. It is noteworthy that while it is the standard
practice for economists to utilize four-firm and eight-firm groupings
in measuring concentration ratios, the critics of the petroleum industry who propose the radical measure of divestiture are forced to
point to an eighteen-firm grouping.
32.

Id. at 4. (Source:

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS: DEP'T OF COMMERCE,

OF MANUFACTURERS: CONCENTRATION RATIOS IN MANUFACTURING.)

1957 AND 1972 CENSUS
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TABLE 33:i
CONCENTRATION RATIOS EOR
OTHER SELECTED INDUSTRIAL SECTORS
OF THE UNITED STATES

Sector

Electric Tubes (Receiving)
Electric Lamps
Hard Surface Floor Coverings
Turbines and Turbine Generators
Chewing Gum
Primary Batteries
Cathode Ray Picture Tubes
Cigarettes
Typewriters
Sewing Machines
Gypsum Products
Chocolate and Cocoa Products
Household Vacuum Cleaners
Woven Carpets and Rugs
Electrometallurgical Products
Medicinals and Botanicals
Household Refrigerators and Freezers
Metal Cans
Mineral Wool
Electron Tubes (Transmitting)
Soap and Other Detergents
Photographic Equipment and Supplies
Cutlery
Explosives
Greeting Card Publishing
Beet Sugar
Transformers
Thread Mills
X-Ray Apparatus and Tubes
Storage Batteries
Glass Containers
Primary Zinc
Phonograph Records
Soybean Oil Mills
Ball and Roller Bearings
Knitting Mills
Distilled Liquor (Except Brandy)
Ceramic Wall and Floor Tile

Percentage of
Value of Shipments
Accounted for by
the Largest 4
Companies

Percentage of
Value of Shipments
Accounted for by
the Largest 8
Companies

1967

1972

1967

1972

94
91
89
76
86
85
84
81
81
81
80
77
76
76
74
74
73
73
71
70
70
69
69
67
67
66
65
62
62
61
60
50
58
55
54
54
54
52

95
90
90
90
87
92
83
84
d
84
80
74
75
78
74
59
85
66
75
55
62
74
55
67
70
66
59
62
54
57
55
66
48
54
53
52
47
56

99
95
99
82
96
95
98
100
99
92
93
89
94
93
90
81
94
84
84
87
78
81
77
91
79
96
78
81
77
83
75
90
67
76
73
71
71
76

99
94
98
96
98
97
97
100
d
92
93
88
91
91
90
75
98
79
89
80
74
85
67
86
78
96
75
77
75
85
76
d
61
69
73
67
73
71
(Continued)

33. Id. at 5-6. (Source: BUREAU OF THE CENSUS: DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1957 AND
CENSUS OF MANUFACTURERS. CONCENTRATION RATIOS IN MANUFACTURING.)
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Commercial Laundry Equipment
Radio and TV Receiving Sets
Sanitary Food Containers
Printing Ink
Wines, Brandy, and Brandy Spirits
Motors and Generators
Abrasive Products
Pulp Mills
Cheese
Raw Cane Sugar
Cottonseed Oil Mills
Copper Rolling and Drawing
Metal Office Furniture

51
49
49
49
48
48
48
45
44
43
42
41
38

53
49
46
39
53
47
49
59
42
44
43
39
42

[Vol. 29:1131
63
69
68
64
63
60
57
70
51
65
60
65
52

65
71
64
54
68
59
60
83
53
62
61
61
54

d. The government withholds these data to avoid disclosing information about
individual companies.
TABLE 434
Four-Firm
Percent of Market

Eight-Firm
Percent of Market

Degree of
Concentration

75% or more

90% or more

Very high

65 -75%

85 - 90%

High

50 - 65%

70 - 85%

Moderately high

35 - 50%

45 - 70%

Moderately low

Under 35%

Under 45%

(2)

Low

Joint Ventures

Since the empirical evidence shows that the petroleum industry
is not highly concentrated, the proponents of divestiture contend
that numerous joint ventures and exchange agreements utilized in
the oil business must be considered along with concentration ratios.
They assert that these agreements are anticompetitive because they
make it possible for the companies involved in joint ventures to
obtain information on the intentions and capabilities of each other25
Joint ventures frequently are used in the petroleum industry in
the exploration, production, and pipeline functions. The real reason
for joint ventures in exploration, production, and pipelines is not to
suppress competition but to share the high risks of exploring new
geologic areas and to finance projects that would be too costly for
most companies, even of giant size, to finance individually. Walter
Mead lists four basic justifications for joint venture operations:
34.
35.

Hearingson S. 2387, supra note 22, pt. 3, at 2230 (1976) (statement of Neil Jacoby).
Id. pt. 1, at 211 (1975) (statement of Congressman Stanton).
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1. They permit entry into an industry or activity where
absolute capital requirements are so high that only a few large
firms could otherwise participate.
2. Risks may be so great that only a few, if any, existing
firms would be willing to participate on their own.
3. Separate operations by competing firms may be economically inefficient.
4. In certain uses, large investments may produce external
economies that will accrue to all firms regardless of their participation in the initial undertaking.36
In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly, Max Eliason, President of the Rocky Mountain Oil and
Gas Association and Senior Vice President and General Counsel of
Skyline Oil Company, said that in the absence of joint ventures
[tihe financing of large projects, such as the development of the frontier areas
of the Alaskan North Slope and the Outer Continental Shelf and the construction of facilities to produce oil and gas from oil shale and coal, would be much
more difficult and perhaps impossible. The magnitude of these projects and
the risks involved have placed a severe strain on the financial abilities of even
the largest oil companies. They are beyond the financial capabilities of smaller
companies. .... 31

In the exploration and production areas of the industry, the
benefits of joint ventures are substantial since they allow the enormous expenses and risks involved in obtaining and developing offshore leases to be shared. This permits more and smaller companies
to participate in and profit from this phase of the industry. In a
study of the competitive effects of joint ventures in the bidding for
tracts in Outer Continental Shelf offshore lease sales, Edward
Erickson and Robert Spann concluded:
Joint ventures have acted as a risk-sharing device and probably facilitated the
entry of small and medium
sized firms which otherwise might not have entered
3
OCS auction markets. 9

Joint pipeline agreements are also prevalent in the petroleum
industry. There are 103 interstate pipelines in the United States of
which approximately sixty-five are joint ventures. Proponents of
divestiture argue that joint pipelines are anticompetitive because
36. Mead, The Competitive Significance of Joint Ventures, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 819,
824-25 (1976).
37. Hearingson S. 2387, supra note 22, pt. 3, at 1844 (1976) (statement of Max Eliason).
38. E. Erickson & R. Spann, An Analysis of the Competitive Effects of Joint Ventures
in the Bidding for Tracts in OCS Offshore Lease Sales, Feb. 1974 (unpublished paper available through American Petroleum Institute).
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they constitute a "barrier" to market entry. This is an argument
without merit. A study of the Colonial pipeline, a large jointly
owned pipeline running from Houston to New York, showed that
rather than erecting barriers to entry into a market area, jointly
owned pipeline enables nonowners to reach new markets at lower
cost to the consumer. Professor Mitchell of the University of Michigan, who conducted the study, concluded:
[On the basis of my studies thus far. . . the pattern of gasoline prices and
gasoline market shares are consistent with the working of the normal processes
of competition and inconsistent with the existence of a cartel of Colonial pipeline owners or of "major" oil companies. 9

The classification of interstate pipelines as common carriers subject
to the rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission mandates the
transportation of oil brought to them from any source at fair and
reasonable rates. 0 They are precluded by law from giving rebates
or engaging in other forms of discrimination."
In his testimony before Congress, Chairman George Stafford of
the ICC stated:
Today there are so few complaints and so few problems that I must say [the
pipelines are] one of the best run transportation systems we have. . . . In
conclusion, it would appear that except for certain impediments brought about
because of environmental considerations, pipelines have been constructed on
an as-needed basis and generally provide good service. It has been our experience that pipeline rates are just and reasonable. . . . We have received no
complaints in recent years involving allegations relative to the size of tender,
the failure to publish through routes and joint rates, or to provide service to
independents.42

(3)

Exchange Agreements

A common practice of the petroleum industry, criticized by the
divestiture proponents as inherently anticompetitive, is the exchange agreement. Industry critics allege that these agreements
deny independent refiners access to crude oil and facilitate a means
of avoiding open market sales which result in increased costs to
consumers. In reality, exchange agreements are a unique device
used by the industry to promote efficiency in the complex logistics
of delivering petroleum products throughout the nation. Without
such arrangements, the costs to consumers would be substantially
39. Hearings on S. 1167, supra note 10, pt. 8, at 6072 (1974).
40. 49 U.S.C. §§ 41-43 (1970).
41. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1, 6, 15, 20, 41(1970).
42. Hearings on Marketing Performance and Competition in the Oil Industry Before
Special Subcomm. on Integrated Oil Operations of the Senate Interior Comm., 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 3, at 896 (1973) (statement of George Stafford).

19761

PETROLEUM DISMEMBERMENT

1145

higher. There is no proof that exchanges are anticompetitive.
Exchange agreements enable a supplier of crude oil or refined
product to trade crude or product located in one section of the
country for crude or product located in a different area. These agreements, negotiated at arms-length, enable the companies to compete
vigorously across the country through lower transportation costs
that are translated ultimately into lower costs to the consumer. In
testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Neil Jacoby of the Graduate School of Management at
UCLA stated:
In my judgment, [exchange agreements] are not anticompetitive features of
the industry. They are ways in which integrated companies and nonintegrated
firms, too, can obtain the kinds of crude oil that they want for their refineries
that they have available to refine it at less cost than if the exchanges were
prohibited. They are, in short, not anticompetitive, but operate to increase the
overall efficiency
of the industry and to help keep down the prices of petroleum
3
products.

Not only are exchange agreements not anticompetitive but indications are that they are beneficial to the independent oil companies since a large percentage of the exchange agreements are between the majors and the independents. The courts have addressed
this very subject on several occasions and have concluded that exchange agreements facilitate rather than stifle competition. In
4 4 the court
United States v. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana),
noted:
Exchange agreements have been used to aid the independents in securing
unbranded regular grade gasoline. . . and permit one refiner of gasoline to do
business in the backyard of its competitor's refinery by the exchange of manufactured products. 5

(4)

Profits

Certainly one of the most specious arguments of the divestiture
proponents is that the high profit levels earned by the petroleum
industry from the third quarter of 1973 to the third quarter of 1974
indicates the existence of monopoly power in the industry. Professor
Edward Mitchell, a recognized authority on the subject of economics in the petroleum industry, has addressed this subject:
[Tihe connection between monopoly and profits is a highly qualified one.
Perhaps the strongest statement that can be made is that the persistence of
43.

Hearingson S. 2387, supra note 22, pt. 3, at 2245 (1976) (statement of Neil Jacoby).
SENATE MINORITY REPORT, supra note 30, at 211.
45. Id.
44.
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abnormally high profits over long periods of time in a particular industry make
it more likely that the industry is monopolistic than competitive."

It is quite misleading to base a charge of monopoly power on a
short-term profit realization given the fact that long-term profitability is the test of monopolistic power. When discussing the shortterm oil industry profits in 1973-1974, it is important to understand
the reasons for the high profits of the industry immediately following the Arab embargo:
[Miost of the increase in profits of the large integrated oil companies have

resulted from a substantial increase in the value of inventories held by the
companies. This, in turn, was caused by inflation, devaluation of the dollar
and the OPEC price hikes. However, when these inventories are replaced at
now higher prices the inventory profits will disappear. Likewise, when the
dollar was devalued in 1973, those oil companies with foreign assets realized a
further accounting profit. All real property and cash denominated in a foreign
currency was immediately worth more in dollars. What is significant about
these accounting gains is that they were due to non-recurring events."

The increases in profits following the embargo were abnormal.
That abnormality is demonstrated by the decline in oil company
profits since mid-1974, as shown by Table 5, as well as by the profitability picture for periods preceding the embargo, as shown in Tables 6 and 7. The empirical evidence would seem to indicate that
the proponents of divestiture have raised the issue of high shortterm, post-embargo profits for the purpose of an emotional appeal.
It is an argument without merit.
46.
47.

MITCHELL, U.S. ENERGY POLICY: A PRIMER 90 (1974).
JOHNSON, supra note 28, at 100, 105.

E.
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TABLE 548
NET PROFITS OF LEADING U. S. OIL COMPANIES

(Percentage Change from the Same Quarter During the Previous Year)
1st
4th
Quar- Quarter
ter
1974 1975

2nd
Quarter
1975

3rd
Quarter
1975

4th
Quarter
1973

1st
Quarter
1974

2nd
Quarter
1974

3rd
Quarter
1974

Exxon
Texaco
Mobil
Gulf
Socal

59.0
70.1
68.2
98.3
94.2

38.8
123.2
65.9
75.7
91.5

66.7
72.1
99.5
28.2
56.6

25.4
23.1
20.2
31.0
32.6

-1.1
-29.5
-51.0
-19.6
3.5

-11.4
-66.0
-28.0
-32.8
8.3

-34.3
-52.2
-46.7
-49.2
-22.5

-31.2
-37.9
-16.8
-36.3
-32.7

Amoco

52.7

81.0

130.8

101.3

43.9

-33.2

-17.1

-28.1

Tenneco

14.4

57.2

37.8

-5.5

-13.1

Arco
Shell
Continental

47.4
-1.5
91.6

86.7
51.9
129.9

104.3
39.1
106.2

140.9
158.4
121.8

5.7
99.3
-30.8

-28.1
-14.3
65.2

-49.6
-5.2
-17.3

-31.8
-26.0
-38.1

59.6
127.6
55.5

84.8
86.4
90.7

163.0
166.8
98.0

84.5
109.6
57.6

-28.0
-2.5
8.8

-63.3
-49.6
-45.1

-58.2
-10.2
-47.2

-30.2
-35.9
2.8

26.3

-45.8

-60.0

Company

Sun
Phillips
Union

-

-

-

-

717.6

292.8

297.3

-

Getty

115.0

172.7

167.2

171.9

11.4

-44.3

9.9

-32.3

Cities Service
Sohio
Amerada Hess
Marathon
Pennzoil

49.8
-39.9
471.9
92.8
68.4

87.0
29.1
35.8
52.5
110.7

76.4
18.9
38.0
147.2
95.0

75.5
105.6
-12.9
49.9
80.3

10.0
146.6
-35.1
-27.6
-

-59.0
-1.8
-44.6
-47.0
-12.4

-49.8
1.6
-27.1
-35.0
-18.6

-7.8
-12.0
-24.3
-31.3
-3.2

Ashland
Kerr-McGee
Murphy
Skelly

52.2
181.0
31.3

22.0
98.9
232.7
97.0

44.5
96.4
52.8
198.9

14.2
143.7
-19.7
280.0

12.2
65.3
-6.8
111.3

12.8
102.3
-40.9
-13.7

-7.3
1.1
-52.0
-1.5

12.4
-2.6
-46.4
-20.2

-

208.5

-

Occidental

Superior

American
Petrofina

218.2

176.3

-

Louisiana Land
Clark

140.8

79.1
-

-

Apco
Commonwealth
Fina
Mapco
Quaker State
Tesoro

-

240.1
-

-

247.6
-

10.2

-137.5

-

-281.3

-

34.0
-

-193.8

-

-64.8
-

-

-

-50.0
-

-148.8

-

-47.6
-

-

-

12.0

-

-

-

-

-

-

183.5

50.4
47.9
-

205.5
22.4
324.2

-

-

-

8.8

-

-

-

-

-

-

Total of Firms
in the Sample: 69.9

78.4

80.2

49.8

-7.7

-

-29.3

-34.5

-2.94

48. Id. at 107-08. (Data from Oil and Gas J., Feb. 18, 1974; May 13, 1974; Aug. 12, 1974;
Nov. 11, 1974; Feb. 17, 1975; May 5, 1975; Aug. 11, 1975; Nov. 10, 1975.)
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(5)

Barriers to Entry

Another method of measuring monopoly power is the ease with
which newcomers may enter an industry. It is the contention of the
proponents of divestiture that barriers to entry exist at various levels of the petroleum industry, which indicates the exercise of monopoly power by the majors. There are barriers to entry in some
functions of the industry, but they are not the result of monopolistic
behavior by the oil companies. Dismembering the petroleum companies will not reduce in any way the approximately 300 million
dollar cost of constructing a modem, efficient refinery. Nor will
divestiture reduce the huge risks and costs involved in offshore or
arctic exploration and production. Despite these high risks and financial burdens, some 132 different firms have participated in winning bids in the thirty-three Outer Continental Shelf sales between
1954 and 1974. 51
Refining is the phase of the industry upon which the divestiture
proponents have focused their attack on ease of entry. They argue
that the majors have erected and maintained barriers to entry into
refining. To support their position they have relied upon a study by
Professors Allvine and Patterson which states:
Since 1950 the integrated oil companies have taken over several of the important independent refineries and there have been built
no new independent
2
refineries with over 50,000 barrel per day capacity.

In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust Monopoly, Donald C. O'Hara, President of the National Petroleum Refiners Association, pointed out that the proponents' argument is
based on erroneous information:
In fact, the following new refineries with a capacity of 50,000 barrels per day
or more have been built by independent companies since 1950:
b/d capacity

Company
Amerada Hess

St. Croix, V.I.

700,000

Commonwealth

Puerto Rico

161,000

Koch Industries

St. Paul, Minn.

109,800

Amerada Hess

Perth Amboy, N.J.

67,900

Hawaiian Independent

Honolulu, Hawaii

60,000

United Refining

Warren, Pa.

58,000

ECOL

New Orleans, La.

51.

Id. at 91.

52.

F. ALLVINE & J. PA'TERSON,

216 (1974).

200,000
(under construction)

HIGHWAY ROBBERY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE GASOLINE CRISIS
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In addition, fifteen other independent companies have each built 50,000 barrels per day or more of new capacity since 1950, either by adding to existing
refineries or by building on a site previously occupied by an older refinery. This
means that actually the equivalent of twenty-two additional refineries of
50,000 barrels per day or more have been built by independent companies since
1950. 51

Today capital requirements to build a refinery are extremely high.
New refineries cost anywhere from 2,000 to 2,500 dollars per barrel
54
per day of capacity.

In addition to the high capital cost element, other significant
barriers to entry are environmental restrictions. Would-be entrants
find it very difficult to obtain the necessary permits due to heavy
opposition by environmental groups. Indeed,
sixteen independent companies have tried unsuccessfully to get building permits to build refineries on the East Coast. .

.

. The chief obstacle to the entry

of new independent refineries in the refining business has been the objection
of the local communities."

High risks, huge capital requirements, and environmental rules constitute real "barriers" to entry into the petroleum business. These
barriers have not been created by the oil companies. Divestiture will
reduce neither the risks nor the capital requirements, nor the desire
to improve the environment. Those same barriers will exist even
though the oil companies are segmented into bits and pieces.
In fact, divestiture itself would establish insurmountable new
barriers preventing entry by the most likely prospects. For example,
successful crude producers would be prohibited from going into refining and prosperous refiners would be barred from entering exploration and production. Thus those most apt to want to enter the
business and who would have the means to do so would be banned
by legislated divestiture.
B. InternationalImplications of Divestiture
The argument by divestiture proponents that the dismembering of the American oil industry will weaken OPEC would seem to
present a real test of credulity. In recent hearings on industrial
reorganization, Frank Zarb, Administrator of the Federal Energy
Administration, aptly summed up the position of economic schol53. Hearings on S. 2387, supra note 22, pt. 1, at 386 (1975) (statement of Donald
O'Hara).
54. J. HASS, E. MITCHELL & B. STONE, FINANCING THE ENERGY INDUSTRY 32 (1974).
55. Hearings on S. 2387, supra note 22, pt. 1, at 387 (1975) (statement of Donald
O'Hara).
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ars, oil company witnesses, and representatives of the administration:
There is also no evidence that U.S. petroleum companies, weakened and reduced in size by divestiture, could bargain with the OPEC cartel more efficiently than the larger, vertically integrated firms, and thereby bring more
secure supplies at lower prices. OPEC's control of prices results from the
cartel's ability to limit production to the level of demand at the price set by
the cartel, and to maintain surplus production capacity within its membership. Since vertical divestiture will not favorably affect the supply and demand outlook for OPEC oil, it will not weaken OPEC's control over prices. The
prorationing of production among OPEC members could become a severe
problem for the OPEC cartel only if faced with a long-term declining market.
Therefore, the only way the United States might exert downward pressure on
the world price of oil is to create alternative domestic sources of supply and
reduce demand for imports. 5

The statement that the companies are not aggressive purchasers is
directly refuted by the events that took place after OPEC's 1974
price formula change. Those events show that as a result of aggressive "shopping" by the oil companies seeking to purchase crude,
Libya, Abu Dhabi, Algeria, and several other countries made a series of price cuts to make their crude more competitive: 7
By July 1975, price shaving among certain OPEC countries had become so
widespread that Algeria was driven to criticize publicly "unjustified" price
cuts by Nigeria, Iraq and Libya.-"

The claim that domestic companies have been serving as a prorationing agent for OPEC is also untenable:
With respect to the asserted prorationing, one should consider the period between the first quarter of 1974, when OPEC production reached a postembargo high level, and the February to April period of 1975 when it reached
a low. Total OPEC production fell 19 percent over the period. Iraqi production
rose 20 percent, however, and Libyan output declined 42 percent. Algeria and
Nigeria, both urgently in need of foreign exchange, had cuts in production of
20 percent and 26 percent, respectively, while Qatar's production fell only 9
percent. These changes reflect the fact that the oil companies were aggressively
shopping around for lower-priced oil rather than fostering any prorationing
scheme for the benefit of exporting nations."

Dismantling the American oil companies will mean simply that
their important role in world petroleum logistics will be taken over
by the large integrated foreign companies like British Petroleum,
56. SENATE MINORTY REPORT, supra note 30, at 199.
57. W. Johnson & R. Messick, The International Implications of the Vertical Divestiture of U.S. Oil Companies, May 25, 1976, at 13-14 (unpublished paper of Energy Policy
Research Project at George Washington University) (copy available through American Petroleum Institute).
58. Id. at 14.
59. SENATE MINORiTy REPORT, supra note 30, at 200.
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Royal Dutch Shell, E.N.I., Compagnie Francaise des Petroles, and
Mitsubishi Oil Company, Ltd. It is ironic that at a time when foreign governments such as Japan, Canada, France, and Great Britain are encouraging vertical integration, the Congress of the United
States is seriously considering breaking asunder the very American
companies which pioneered the world petroleum business.
IV.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF DIVESTITURE

A.

Increased Operating Costs

Vertical integration clearly permits firms to realize important
economies in the production of petroleum and petroleum products.
This means that after the break up is implemented (and there is no
doubt the transition period will be protracted and turbulent), the
price level for petroleum will be higher. There are several reasons
why the price level will rise.
First, former intra-firm exchanges will become inter-firm in
nature; management and administrative staffs necessarily will be
duplicated. Forced to place greater reliance on intermediate markets, the industry also will have to expend additional resources
searching for information on transaction opportunities and communicating between firms to arrange and conclude buyer-seller agreements. Each disintegrated unit will look to maximize its own welfare by improving its bargaining position relative to its suppliers
and customers; therefore, each will devote resources to achieving an
edge in negotiating skill and to obtaining and interpreting market
data." Costs of enforcing agreements with other firms will also rise,
as will the costs of adjusting to unanticipated variations in contracted prices, quantities, and qualities. Taken together, these
added transaction costs simply will increase the domestic costs of
producing petroleum and its derivatives.
Dismemberment also would result in the loss of some present
technological economies that large-scale operations allow. Specifically, the increasing uncertainty surrounding the availability of
crude supplies and market outlets would make companies averse to
committing the enormous sums required to finance large-scale refinery and pipeline ventures. Refineries and pipelines built after divestiture therefore probably would be at smaller capacities than
60. As Mitchell notes, the costs firms incur in trying to improve their negotiating skill
and in "haggling" with their counterparts are wasteful. What one firm gains in the process,
the other loses. Accordingly, the two firms collectively, as well as society as a whole, suffer a
net loss of scarce resources. Mitchell, supra note 14, at 76.
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otherwise would have been the case absent divestiture. If so built,
they would be less efficient; consequently, society would be denied
opportunities to benefit from lower unit production costs that economies of size bring to these industry sectors.
Furthermore, divestiture would effectively limit the opportunities for asset diversification available to petroleum companies, and
thus would affect their ability to attract capital. As indicated earlier, investors perceive the future income stream of a vertically integrated oil company because of the former's asset diversification and
the imperfect correlation of profits between industry sectors. In effect, earnings fluctuations in production, refining, transportation,
and marketing tend to cancel out within a vertically integrated firm
in much the same way that fluctuations in returns on individual
securities cancel out in a portfolio. Consequently, the integrated
company represents a less risky investment and is rewarded, in
sorts, by the investment community with a lower cost of capital.'
Divestiture, by destroying the asset diversification gained by
integration, will heighten the uncertainties and reduce the attractiveness of investment in each of the divested parts of the formerly
integrated companies. The cost of capital to each divested part will
rise relative to the cost of capital it would have enjoyed as part of
an integrated, diversified whole. For thirteen of the larger petroleum
companies, the increase in capital costs resulting from a break-up
of their vertical structures has been conservatively estimated to be
one billion dollars per year.2 Investor uncertainties also may be
amplified because each divested unit will be an untested firm with
new management, new policies and objectives, and no "track record" of its own." For these reasons, capital would tend to flow
toward the fragmented companies only at higher costs, necessitating
greater revenue needs in each of the divested parts of the industry.
B. Increased Costs for United States Consumers
Unless there are any as yet unforeseen counteracting reductions
in costs, divestiture will force domestic firms to raise product prices
to offset the added expenses of less efficient organization. Consequently, the domestic consumer ultimately will bear the higher
costs of producing, refining, transporting, and marketing petroleum.
61. See note 23 supra.
62. Mitchell, supra note 14, at 100-01.
63. What matters to investors is the prospect of future profitability. For investment
purposes, whether a firm has no history to which investors can refer is relevant only to the
extent investors draw inferences about the future from the past.

1156

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1131

Elementary economics suggests that the magnitude of product
price increases will depend upon the lowest cost competitor in the
domestic market following divestiture. As a result of the positive
economies derived from vertical integration, fully integrated foreign
firms will have cost advantages in production over a divested American petroleum industry. Assuming foreign integrated firms are not
restricted from the post-divestiture domestic market, prices will rise
to domestic petroleum consumers but only to the extent that foreign
integrated firms are able to provide products less expensively.
On the other hand, if foreign firms are excluded from operating
domestically as integrated entities, consumers probably will pay
even higher prices for petroleum goods since United States firms
then would be able to pass on divestiture-incurred costs that otherwise would be absorbed internally because of low-cost foreign competition.
At present, it is not clear that if divestiture legislation is enacted, foreign firms will be prohibited from competing in the domestic market on an integrated basis. Nevertheless, on the apparent
assumption that domestic companies will be able to pass on to
consumers all costs arising from divestiture, it has been estimated
recently that on an industry-wide basis divestiture-caused inefficiencies would translate directly into more than five billion dollars
in annually recurring costs for American consumers. Aside from the
sheer magnitude of these costs, a deadweight loss to society in toto,
what ought to concern divestiture advocates is the social inequity
of the burden to be imposed on different income groups. Particularly
hard-hit by the inflationary impact will be those people who can
least afford it, especially those on the lower end of the income ladder
who spend a relatively larger percentage of their discretionary income on necessary petroleum products.
C.

Transition Costs

The divestiture consequences mentioned so far imply greater
costs (and therefore higher prices to consumers) after divestiture is
effected and equilibrium has been restored in the domestic petroleum industry. There also would be costs, however, associated with
the transition from the present organizational structure to the new
structure mandated by Congress. Included in these costs would be
those incurred in designing and effectuating individual company
divestiture plans (for example, the costs of categorizing and separat64.

Hearingson S. 2387, supra note 22, pt. 1, at 341 (1975) (Exxon statement).
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ing assets, of selling or otherwise distributing them, and of arranging
and establishing new managements), retiring the firm's outstanding
debt and equity instruments, and raising capital in an atmosphere
of great uncertainty. The magnitude of these costs is unknown, but
certainly the constitutionality of divestiture and numerous other
legal issues will be litigated in protracted court battles. The extent
of these transition costs also will depend on the manner in which
individual companies restructure management echelons, the extent
to which current debt and equity instruments must be retired and
refinanced, and the ability of capital markets to handle refinancing.
To be sure, the cost of completely refinancing outstanding debt
would in itself be great. In 1974, the long-term debt burden of Chase
Manhattan's "Group" of twenty-nine major petroleum companies
(all of whom would be affected in some way by S.2387) amounted
to 25.6 billion dollars on which interest (2.5 billion dollars) was paid
at a rate of approximately ten percent. 5 Investors willingly purchased bonds bearing this average yield because the firms selling
them were integrated and financially sound. Nevertheless, if the
broad asset bases of these companies were broken apart and their
earnings potential diminished, investors would envision an increase
in the probability of default at redemption time.
Under these circumstances, bondholders are certain to demand
interest rates in excess of the average ten percent rate at which debt
was financed in 1974. Assuming the entire 25.6 billion dollars debt
burden of the "Group" had to be refinanced at the moderately
higher rate of twelve percent, those companies alone would have to
expend collectively an additional 512 million dollars annually on
interest charges. This calculation, however, does not account for the
growth in the debt level that has occurred since 1974 to finance new
capital expenditures. Therefore, to the extent twelve percent is a
realistic approximation of the increased average rate at which debt
would have to be refinanced,6 " 512 million dollars probably understates the recurring annual increase in interest charges that these
companies would have to pay.
65. CHASE MANHATrAN BANK, FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF A GROUP OF PETROLUM COMPANIES:
1974, at 30 (Energy Econ. Div. publ. Sept. 1975) [hereinafter cited as CHASE MANHATrAN].
66. Mitchell estimated that the cost of equity capital to disintegrated petroleum companies would rise by 20% over normal as a result of increased risk. Mitchell, supra note 14,
at 99-101. Assuming interest rates respond to risk in proportion to the response of equity
capital costs, 12% is a reasonable estimate of the rate at which debt would be refinanced.
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D. Implications for the Economy and Domestic Energy
Development
It seems certain that during the transition period, with industry
forced to focus its resources and full attention on the procedural
aspects of complying with divestiture, investment in domestic energy development will not continue to grow at the rapid pace it has
in recent years. 7 Further, the added uncertainties surrounding operations in a divested industry will discourage United States petroleum investment beyond the transition period. Without assurances
of continued crude oil input or market outlet availability, for example, United States companies are likely to become reluctant to make
the large capital expenditures required for new grassroots refinery,
refinery expansion, or pipeline projects. Investment in research and
development of synthetic fuel from coal also may decline with the
fragmentation of the large vertically integrated companies since
they have had both the incentive and the resources to conduct
R & D activities and now account for the lion's share of R & Drelated expenditures.68
Even assuming a willingness on the part of firms to make new
energy expenditures, limited or more expensive funds will present
a bottleneck. Over the next few years the capital market is expected
to become extremely tight. For the first time in recent American
history, the supply of funds may not grow as quickly as the potential
demand for funds. 9 Under these circumstances, capital availability
may become a constraint on investment and the capital market may
not be able to satisfy all potential demands for capital. Investors
will be in a position to pick and choose between investments selecting the best opportunities as they see them. Since divestiture will
increase investors' perceptions of risk and their awareness of alternative investment opportunities, investors will be less likely to commit funds to those companies so affected and will be persuaded to
do so only at higher rates of return. At higher capital costs, however,
many projects will no longer promise attractive returns to the companies and so will not be undertaken.
Nor is it likely that divested firms will realize profit levels high
enough to satisfy their capital needs from internally generated
67. Chase Manhattan reports that the domestic capital expenditures of its "Group" of
29 companies rose from $7.6 billion in 1973 to $13.4 billion in 1974, an increase of 76.4%. See
CHASE MANHATTAN,

supra note 65, at 19.

68. Hearings on S. 2387, supra note 22, pt. 3, at 2236 (1976) (statement of Neil Jacoby);
Id. pt. 3, at 1844-45 (1976) (statement of Max Eliason).
69. Hearings on S. 2387, supra note 22, pt. 3, at 1966 (1976).
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funds. Even as presently structured, the industry has relied in recent years more heavily on debt financing as a means of capital
formation. 0 Moreover, if foreign integrated firms are able to compete in the United States market and the economies gained from
integration allow them to charge prices lower than divested American firms may charge, foreign firms gradually will acquire domestic
market shares at the expense of domestic companies and the latter's
earnings will suffer. Similarly, because they will face competition
from the same foreign companies in international markets, United
States firms are likely to be less successful in running overseas operations as well."
Because of the magnitude of the capital expenditures made by
the American petroleum industry (13.4 billion dollars in 1974), any
curtailment or slowdown in the rate of petroleum investment
domestically will have significant negative effects on the nation's
economy. One important consequence will be the loss of thousands
of jobs for United States citizens. The Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress estimated that divestiture would add
from 200,000 to 700,000 members of the American labor force to the
1976 unemployment roll.12 This figure, however, does not count the
indirect effect on employment. Presumably such a large reduction
in petroleum capital expenditures, coming as it would during a
fragile period of economic recovery, will induce comparable spending cutbacks in other sectors of the economy.
The rate of economic growth also would be affected adversely
by a slowdown in business investment. Projections by the Library
of Congress indicate that under the foregoing investment scenario
there would be a decrease in Gross National Product between 1977
and 1983 totaling 201.7 billion dollars (low estimate) or 351.1 billion
3
dollars (high estimate) .
70. CHASE MANHATrAN, supra note 65.
71. If Congress does not require the divestiture of foreign based assets, the international
effects may be mitigated somewhat because other governments do not appear at this time to
have policy intentions that would ban vertical integration within their borders. In fact, foreign
governments have, for the most part, reacted positively to vertical integration. Both Italy and
France, for example, have organized their state-owned companies (ENI and ELF ERAP,
respectively), on an integrated basis. See FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, AN EVALUATION
OF THE OPTIONS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN ITS RELATIONSHIP TO U.S. FIRMS IN INTERNATIONAL

PETROLEUM AFFAIRS 29-36 (1975). The Japanese government recently has indicated that it will
encourage vertical integration in its domestic petroleum industry. See JapanPlans to Reorganize Her Troubled Oil Industry, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1975, at 43, col. 2.
72. Howard Useem, The Impact of Petroleum Divestiture on the U.S. Economy, June
9, 1976, at 26 (unpublished paper of Library of Congress Congressional Research Service)
(copy available through American Petroleum Institute).
73. Id.

1160

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1131

Further, curtailed investment in domestic energy development
would jeopardize the nation's ability to pursue steady economic
growth over the long run. Empirical studies indicate that energy use
has remained constant relative to Gross National Product for a long
time. 74 It follows, therefore, that economic growth is closely tied to
energy consumption and that dependable supplies of energy are an
indispensable requisite to growth. Yet in spite of this truism, the
United States has continued to experience a growing gap between
domestic energy demand and domestic capacity in energy production that has led to a growing reliance on petroleum imports from
politically volatile foreign sources. Today the United States is importing roughly forty percent of its petroleum needs and will be
forced to import approximately fifty percent of its needs by 1980,
with most of the increase coming from the Middle East and North
Africa. Becoming more dependent on insecure foreign supplies, the
nation has exposed itself to periodic and potentially harmful economic disruption should those supplies be cut off. The severe impact of the politically motivated Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974
should serve as a reminder of the potential harm that may come
from overdependence on foreign energy supplies. Even today, the
economic reverberations of that six-month embargo, which inter75
rupted less than one-third of the nation's import requirements,
continue to be felt throughout the economy. Should the Arabs impose another six-month embargo on the United States in the next
year, estimates are that the projected Gross National Product would
decline between 39 and 56 billion dollars accompanied by a loss of
7
1.5 million jobs. 1
The upshot is that by discouraging investment in domestic energy development, divestiture would increase American reliance on
foreign energy supplies, thereby strengthening the OPEC cartel.
Because of the long lead times involved in bringing new energy
production capacity on stream, even minor delays in domestic investment could prove costly to the nation. Should energy
development be suspended for even as short a period as three years,
it has been calculated that domestic energy supplies would be reduced by 2.5 million barrels per dayin 1980 and by approximately
4.0 million barrels per day in 1985 vis-a-vis current total domestic
74. See

CHASE MANHATTAN BANK,

How
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MUCH INVESTMENT

1, Fig. 1

(Energy Econ. Div. publ. Mar. 1975).
75. Hearings on S. 1167, supra note 10, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 9, at 564 (1975)
(statement of Wallace Wilson).
76. Hearingson S. 2387, supra note 22, pt. 3, at 1843 (1976) (statement of Max Eliason).
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production of 8.2 million barrels per day." Presuming this lost production could be replaced with imported energy supplies, the nation
will face an added balance-of-payments drain, in addition to greater
economic insecurity. At eleven dollars per barrel, replacement costs
would add 10 billion dollars annually to the trade deficit by 1980
and 16 billion dollars annually by 1985.
E.

Costs to Stockholders and Bondholders

One other consequence of divestiture is that claimants on the
assets of integrated companies will suffer real losses on their investment, contrary to what the proponents of divestiture have argued.
By breaking up the integrated oil companies, the low "risk premium" with which they initially attracted capital (by virtue of their
diversification, growth rates, and proven capabilities of management) will be lost and replaced by a higher "risk premium" resulting from investor skepticism over the viability of the separated
parts. Assuming that complete refinancing of the debt base is undertaken, outstanding debt could be refinanced only at higher interest rates since creditors would demand compensation for the greater
uncertainties surrounding petroleum investment. For company
stockholders, this would be equivalent to increasing the costs of
doing business and thus the value of the company to them, like any
asset, will decline. If refinancing of the debt is not required or is
limited, the effect on stockholders will be mitigated on this last
count, but the value of outstanding bonds will decrease because of
the uncertainty of timely redemption. In the former case it is the
wealth of the stockholders that will be reduced primarily, and in the
latter case that of the bondholders.
Divestiture will have consequences not only for the long-term
debt base; other assets owned by stockholders will depreciate in
value due, inter alia, to the reduction in diversification. Refining or
pipeline equity, for example, will be worth less to owners without
assured sources of crude supplies, or if such assurance must be
purchased more expensively.
Because of the ownership of integrated oil company stocks and
bonds by a large portion of the United States population, the reductions in wealth caused by the devaluation of these instruments will
have a direct impact on the welfare of millions of Americans."8 Con77. Hearings on S. 2387, supra note 22, pt. 1, at 340 (1975) (Exxon statement).
78. Counting only the 6 largest vertically integrated oil companies, there are 14 million
direct and indirect (2.3 and 11.7 million, respectively) shareowners. SENATE MINORrY REPoRT,
supra note 30, at 202. This accounts for 6.5% of the total population.

1162

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1131

sidering that many of these people have invested directly or indirectly in these securities as a means of providing for future contingencies, college educations, or retirement, divestiture would work
many personal financial hardships.
Thus it is apparent that divestiture will impose real costs on
society. These costs probably will be heavy. Nevertheless, the costs
might be justified if divestiture also provided benefits for society.
To be sure, proponents of divestiture argue that there are benefits
to be gained. They maintain that market power in the industry
would be reduced if vertical integration were banned or limited and
that consumers would benefit from the increased competition. It has
been shown elsewhere in this article, however, that the domestic
petroleum industry is competitive to the extent competition can be
measured from indicators of structure and performance. In addition, the economics literature indicates that if conditions or competition exist at successive production stages, integration between
those stages will not increase monopoly power horizontally at any
of the stages.79 It follows, then, that divestiture cannot increase
competition in the United States petroleum industry."0 In view of
the costs associated with divesting the American petroleum industry and the absence of any other plausible benefit from doing so,
divestiture legislation simply cannot be construed as being in the
best interest of the nation.
79. See note 2 supra.
80. In fact, divestiture may actually reduce competition by increasing concentration
horizontally. Jacob writes:
A little noted but no less important consequence of vertical disintegration of the U.S.
petroleum industry would be a significant rise in its horizontal integration(concentration). A primary motive for vertical integration has been the desire to limit risks. Refiners enter crude oil production to assure a supply of crude, or they acquire service
stations to assure marketing outlets for products. Forced vertical disintegration would
restore to the smaller single-stage surviving companies the higher level of risk that was
reduced by vertical integration. Many of these companies would be unable to survive
periods of business adversity. They would suffer bankruptcy or seek mergers to become
larger and stronger companies, better able to carry high risks. Horizontal integration is
also a device for reducing risk by geographical diversification of markets and extending
product lines. With foreclosure of vertical integration as a risk-limiting strategy, strong
market forces would be created to produce larger and financially stronger firms. After a
decade or so, the oil industry might well end up with a higher level of concentrationat
each stage than obtains today. The ironic result of legislation intended to produce
smaller firms in the petroleum industry might be to enlarge their average size!
Hearingson S. 2387, supra note 22, pt. 3, at 2236 (1976) (statement of Neil Jacoby). See also
JOHNSON,

supra note 28, at 53.

